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Impasse and Accommodation: The Protection of
Private Direct Foreign Investment in the
Developing States
by Lyman H. Heine*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he ideological challenge of the Third World to many of the custom-
ary rules of international law has been a frequent theme in the litera-
ture of the last several decades. The developing states have been accused
of relying upon the "forum," of using a conception of law based upon the
political and economic principles of their New International Economic
Order and of arguing for a "law equated with justice, and further, with
justice defined in relation to themselves."1
The developed states have maintained an ideological position of their
own by insisting upon Third World adherence to the traditional rules of
international law. As Morgenthau noted:
International law fulfills an ... ideological function for politics of the
status quo. Any legal order tends to be primarily a static social force. It
defines a certain distribution of power and offers standards and processes
to ascertain and maintain it in concrete situations .... The invocation
of international law, of "order with law," of "ordinary legal processes" in
support of a particular foreign policy... always indicates the ideological
disguise of a policy of the status quo.'
The ideological debate between the Third World's conceptions of the
New International Economic Order, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
*Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University, Fresno, Cal.
Friedheim, The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A
Case Study, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 76 (R. Falk and W.
Hanreider eds. 1968).
Reference to the Third World position towards international law has been so numerous
that no listing is provided here. One of the earliest references, however, can be found in Q.
Wright, THE LEGAL BACKGROUND IN THE FAR EAST 20 (1941).
2 H. Morgenthau, POLITIcs AMONG NATIONs, 4th ed. 87-88 (1967). Morgenthau uses
Mannheims' concept of ideology ("particular ideology"), which reflects skepticism of other
ideas and representations of one's opponents as they are perceived as concealing the oppo-
nent's real interest and purpose. Id. note 1, at 83.
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Resources, and the Rights and Duties of States, and the developed states'
insistence upon the minimum standard of justice, diplomatic protection,
and adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is presently at an im-
passe. There is a limited political stand-off as well: the Third World
states dominate the voting in the international forums while the devel-
oped states control bilateral development assistance and the votes of the
international investment banks. In general the developing states demand
change which the developed states can prevent. Nevertheless, both groups
of states have shown a willingness to accommodate some of their conflict-
ing economic and political interests. Outstanding differences over many
substantive issues of foreign investment still remain, but the "gun boat"
confrontations that once characterized the enforcement of State Respon-
sibility for Injuries to Aliens have become historical examples of Western
imperialism and "dollar diplomacy. ' ' s
The willingness of both groups of states to seek accommodation has
been influenced by a number of factors: the changing nature of private
international investment and public development assistance; the almost
certain ideological and political repercussions against any Western state
using force to protect the investments of its nationals; the increasing de-
pendency of the developing states upon foreign corporations for capital,
technology, services and marketing; and the expanding role assumed by
all states within their economies. It would be incorrect to predict the
obsolescense of the customary rules of law governing State Responsibility,
but the protection once afforded private direct foreign investment prop-
erty and contracts through the use of diplomatic protection and interna-
tional claims is gradually being supplemented by other means by which
foreign investment risks can be considerably reduced.
This article explores the nature of the present-day ideological chal-
lenge to State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens by comparing the
Latin American and Third World positions toward these laws. The extent
to which the developing states have associated themselves with the Latin
American efforts to restrict the application of these laws is examined. Fi-
nally, the mechanisms by which the developed states and a growing num-
ber of Third World states, as well as foreign investors and host govern-
ments, are using to resolve investment disputes are reviewed.
Almost twenty years ago, the late Wolfgang Friedmann stressed his
belief that:
... the principles of contemporary international law dealing with the
Jessup, The Responsibility of States for Damages to Individuals, 46 COLUM. L. REV.
906 (1946). A comprehensive bibliography on State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens can
be readily found in the notes to M. McDougal, H. Lasswell and L. Chen, The Protection of
Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined
with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 432-469 (1976).
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security, protection, and compensation value of foreign property must be
such that they are acceptable not solely to one group of contemporary
nations but to a representative majority across the world, and across the
divergent phases of development and economic philosophy. At least this
must be the postulate, unless we are to accept the legal as well as the
political division of the world not only into two blocs but into three or
more rival groups of nations, each representing a particular congeries of
interests and values.4
At that time Friedmann saw some "promising beginnings." Today, the
question is whether the international legal system has moved beyond
those "beginnings."
II. THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES
The political and economic conditions that gave rise to the body of
rules governing State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens did not fully
develop until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Although Grotius
in the seventeenth century and Vattel in the eighteenth laid a basis for
the modern doctrine of diplomatic production, their writings are more
significant today for their illustration of the general obligations assumed
to be imposed upon a Sovereign in the treatment of aliens. These obliga-
tions found their logical extension in the nineteenth century with the ex-
pansion of international trade and investment in the newly independent
states of Latin America. Diplomatic protection was not limited to this
geographical area, but the frequency of Great Power intervention6 and
the thousands of claims which arose involving the Latin American states7
left an indelible mark upon this branch of international law and clearly
established the opposition of the Latin American states toward these
rules.
Various factors contributed to the role played by the doctrine of dip-
lomatic protection in the Americas. For the most part, Africa and Asia
were devoid of independent states or they increasingly fell under the ju-
4 Friedmann, Social Confit and the Protection of Foreign Investment, in PROC. OF
THE AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 126, 126-27 (1963).
5 Id.
0 The more blatant interventions: France (Argentina and Mexico, 1838); France and
England (Argentina, 1845); France, England and Spain (Mexico, 1862); England (Brazil,
1863); Italy (Columbia, 1885 and 1898); Germany (Haiti, 1897); England, Germany and Italy
(Venezuela, 1902); and the United States (Dominician Republic, 1907; Nicaragua, 1911;
Mexico, 1914; and Haiti, 1915).
Although the total number of claims vary according to whether types of claims were
considered together or jointly, the American-Mexican Claims Commission of 1868, for exam-
ple, had 2015 claims presented to it, of which 353 were allowed. The Commission of 1923
had 3617 claims filed before it. See 3 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2068a-
2068n (1943).
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risdiction of the European colonial powers. Japan had essentially isolated
herself from the West. In China and some areas of Africa, Asia and the
Near East treaties often enabled citizens from the European Powers to
remain under the jurisdiction of their own states. While Latin America
avoided the full effects of nineteenth century colonialism and capitula-
tions, foreigners were attracted to these "less civilized" states because of
the commercial fortunes which could be made. The inconveniences that
gave commercial advantage to the aliens were frequently the very condi-
tions upon which aliens based their claims of "injustices." 8
The claims by foreigners were based in large part upon concepts'
such as the sacredness of property and the sanctity of contracts, which
had been unrealistically incorporated from European and North Ameri-
can political ideology and placed in the constitutions of the Latin Ameri-
can Republics.9 Considering the chaotic conditions that existed in these
newly independent states, governments could not insure adequate protec-
tion to aliens no matter how seriously "(they) tried." 10 There were in-
stances where governments failed to meet their contractual obligations,
which successor but bankrupt governments refused to honor. Neverthe-
less, the standard of justice claimed by aliens was more relative to the
economic and social development, including political stability, of their na-
tive states.
In contrast to numerous present-day claims involving compensation
and inconvertability, the diplomatic claims against the Latin American
governments were generally based on the following conditions: failure to
offer adequate police protection to aliens; failure to take appropriate pu-
nitive measures against those who mistreated aliens; failure to provide
adequate procedural and substantive justice in situations where aliens
were subject to criminal or civil action; and, failure to provide such safe-
guards to aliens in disputes concerning public or private contracts."
8 T. Esquivel Obregon, MEXICO Y Los ESTADoS UNIDOS ANTE EL DERECHO INTERNA-
TIONAL 154-155 (1926).
F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALs 54 (1932).
10 C. RONNING, LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 35 (1963).
Id. at 34. Whiteman has provided considerable insight not only into international
practice regarding the measurement of damages for injuries to aliens but the genre of claims
typical in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In situations involving wrongful ar-
rest, detention, and imprisonment "the amounts recovered ... varied from approximately
eight dollars for a day's imprisonment to $2,000 for imprisonment for only one and a half
hours." 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 7, at 383. It is a mistake to assume, however, that the
exorbitant amounts were claimed only against the Latin American states. The standards of
the day were applied, although certainly less frequently, even against the United States.
One commission in 1874 granted Llewellyn Crowther, a British subject, $100 for the claim-
ant's allegation that "language abusively and indecently violent toward him and toward his
country and Queen" were made during a warranted arrest. Crowther's initial claim was for
$10,000." Id. at 343-344.
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While most claims were settled through normal diplomatic channels
and domestic commissions rather than direct armed intervention, the fre-
quency by which international arbitration commissions were used during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries illustrates the extent to
which the Latin American states were confronted with the laws of State
Responsibility. Between 1794, when an arbitration commission was estab-
lished by the United States and Great Britain under the Jay Treaty, and
1932, 101 international commissions arbitrated state claims, many of
which were in consequence of World War I. For the historical record, the
United States was involved as the claimant state in 48 commissions,
Great Britain in 20, France in eight, and Italy in six. The Latin American
states were respondents in 67 arbitration commissions, in which the
United States was a claimant in 37 instances.1 2
Despite the frequent criticisms directed against the abuses associated
with the laws of State Responsibility, Jessup noted that the history of
this area of international law exemplifies "the way in which a body of
customary international law develops in response to the needs for adjust-
ment of clashing interests."'" Dunn argued that the practice of diplomatic
protection was to some degree advantageous to the interests of the Latin
American states. In other areas of the world, "territorial conquest was
then taking place on much slighter provocation than was being offered in
some Latin American countries."' 4 In the absence of the institution of
diplomatic protection, "there is no reason at all to believe that . . . the
stronger states would have been content to stand by and do nothing while
their citizens in Latin American countries were receiving treatment which
appeared unjust or improper. 11 5 The rules of State Responsibility delayed
and discouraged "the resort to forceful action by stronger states when
their citizens sustained what was regarded as mistreatment in the terri-
tory of the weaker states."'" More recently, Lillich contended that "the
belief that state responsibility is a product of 19th century economic im-
perialism has been accepted too easily."" It is a mistake to believe that
the development of this branch of international law "occurred solely be-
cause strong nations wished to have a legal basis for coercing weaker
states."' Is The method of enforcement, i.e., intervention, more than the
I
12 These figures are based upon 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 6, at 2068a-2068n. Totals
for the United States and Great Britain involve 8 bilateral commissions between the two
countries.
13 p. JESSUP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS 95 (1968).
F. DUNN, supra note 9, at 57.
15 Id.
"' Id. at 58.
17 Lillich, Toward the Formulation of an Acceptable Body of Law Concerning State
Responsibility, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 735 (1965).
Is Id.
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nature of the rules of State Responsibility antagonized the Latin
Americas."
Whether antagonized by intervention or by legal coercion from the
developed states, the response of the Latin American countries and their
diplomats was to develop legal doctrines and practices which would nar-
rowly confine the practice of diplomatic protection. The Inter-American
Juridical Committee has claimed more forcefully that "the majority of
the American states . . . have struggled constantly and tenaciously to re-
duce or abolish" the laws of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens.2
In a 1962 report on the Contribution of the American Continent to the
Principles of International Law that Govern the Responsibility of the
State, the Inter-American Juridical Committee ennumerated ten postu-
lates which together formed a juridical basis for the American doctrine of
the responsibility of the state."' The first postulate stated that interven-
tion by a state in the internal or external affairs of another state was "not
admissible to enforce the responsibility" of the latter state.2 2 The second
postulate reiterated the long-standing Latin American position on the
equality of treatment for nationals and aliens. A state's responsibility
arose only in those "cases and conditions, where, according to its own
laws, it has such responsibility towards its own nationals. '2 3
With respect to contractual debts due to another state or its nation-
als, the third postulate precluded a state from using armed force to en-
force payment of debts, even if "the debtor State fails to reply to a propo-
sal for arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitral award."' 4
The fourth postulate restated the Calvo Doctrine: if the alien re-
nounces the diplomatic protection of his government or if domestic legis-
lation subjects the alien to the jurisdiction of the local courts or places
the alien in a similar status with nationals, the state is relieved of all
international responsibility. 25 The fifth postulate declared that damages
suffered by aliens as a consequence of political or social disturbances or
by acts of private individuals did not create international responsibility
"except in the case of the fault of duly constituted authorities. ' 26 The
sixth postulate rejected the theory that the state was responsible for the
19 Id.
20 INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, CONTRIBUTION OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT GOVERN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE,
reprinted in OAS OR Doc. C1J-61, OEA/Ser.IIVI. 2 (1962).
21 Id. at 7-8.
22 Id. at 9-12.
20 Id. at 13-18.
24 Id. at 19-21.
22 Id. at 22-27. Brazil has never stipulated the Calvo Clause in administrative contracts
with foreigners.
26 Id. at 28-31.
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risk of injuries suffered by an alien since the latter's residence was a ben-
efit to the state. The Latin American states held that "the state was liable
only where fault, negligence or omission was proven."27
According to the seventh postulate, damages arising from aggressive
war were the responsibility of the state responsible for the war.28 The
eighth postulate stated that the obligation of a state to afford judicial
protection was fulfilled "when it places at the disposal of foreigners the
national courts and the legal remedies essential to implement" the rights
of aliens.29 Therefore, no denial of justice exists if aliens can "place their
cases before competent domestic courts" of the state.30 No further inter-
national obligation remains when "the judicial authority pronounces its
decisions, even if it disallows the claim, action or appeal brought by the
foreigner," or if the decision is unsatisfactory to the alien.31
The ninth postulate maintained that a state was responsible if it pro-
vided aid to others "who conspire or encourage hostile movements against
a foreign state" or if the state fails to prevent by available means such
situations from occurring.32 Finally, the American contribution to the
laws of State Responsibility was found in the rights and duties of states
as frequently expressed in the international declarations and treaties of
the American states.3 3
The Inter-American Juridical Committee admitted that these postu-
lates were not unanimously accepted throughout the Western Hemi-
sphere "because the position of the United States of America is contrary
to or in disagreement with them."' Dr. James Oliver, the U.S. represen-
tative was critical of the Committee's omission of the practice and law
that had developed between the Latin American states, the European
states, and the United States. Particular issue was taken with three of
the postulates which, he argued, had "not received acceptance in general
international law" and which, as proposed, tended to favor international
irresponsibility, i.e., the national standard of treatment, the waiver of
diplomatic protection and denial of justice limited to refusal of access to
national courts. 5
27 Id. at 32.
" Id. at 35-36.
2I Id.
0 Id.
11 Id. at 37-41.
32 Id. at 44.
33 Id. at 46.
31 Id. at 6. In 1965, the Inter-American Juridical Committee summarized "Principles of
International Law that Govern the Responsibility of the State in the Opinion of the United
States of America." See OAS OR Doc. CIJ-78, OEA/Ser.I/VI.2, at 7-12 (1965).
35 Id. at 73. Dr. Hugo Gobbi, the Argentine representative, questioned the report on
several grounds, including the report's failure to note the discrepancies of state practice
1982
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These ten postulates cited by the Inter-American Juridical Commit-
tee formed the ideological response of the Latin American states to the
customary rules of State Responsibility. At the heart of this ideology as
stated by former Secretary of State William Rodgers "is the body of doc-
trine inherited from Calvo .... "36 Although the developed states have
tried to maintain the substantive norms of the 1962 General Assembly
resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources,3 7 efforts "to endow the Calvo Doctrine. .. with limited interna-
tional status"38 reflect the support of the Third World and Communist
states for the Latin American position.3 9 These efforts have resulted in
the adoption of the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources by the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board in 1972,40 the
1973 General Assembly resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natu-
ral Resources, 41 and, especially, the Charter of the Economic Rights and
among the American states and the report's formulation of the principles of equality of
treatment, denial of justice, and the Calvo Clause. Moreover, he believed that there was no
juridical standing to the Committee's conclusion "that the majority of the American states
... have struggled constantly and tenaciously to reduce or abolish" (Gobbi's emphasis) the
laws of State Responsibility. For Gobbi's dissenting opinion, see id. at 54-58.
3' Rodgers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment
Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1978).
11 GA. Res. 1803, 17 UN GAOR, Supp. 17, at 15, UN Doc. A5217 (1962). This resolution
was adopted by a vote of 87-2 (France and South Africa)-1 (Soviet Union). The United
States was able to support this resolution because, as U.S. United Nation's Ambassador
John Scali later explained in 1973 during a Security Council debate on sovereignty over
natural resources dealing with coercion against Latin American countries, the resolution
"recognizes that sovereignty over natural resources is to be exercised in accordance with
international law. [Resolution 1803] expressly provides that foreign investment agreements
should be observed in good faith and that appropriate cooperation should be part in cases of
nationalization in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in
the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law." DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 336 (1973).
Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle
of International Law Under Attack. 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 360-61 (1975).
39 Id.
40 T.D. RES. 86 (XII), 12 U.N. TDOR Supp. (No.1) at 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/423 (1973).
Reprinted in 11 ILM 1474 (1972). This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 39-2 (Greece
and the United States) - 23. The key portion of this resolution stated that "2 . . .such
measures are the expression of nationalization as States may adopt in order to recover their
natural resources are the expression of a sovereign power in virtue of which it is for each
state to fix the amount of compensation and the procedures for these measures, any dispute
which may arise in that connexion falls within the sole jurisdiction of its courts, without
prejudice to what is set forth in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) .... "
41 G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, UN Doc A/9631 (1974). This
Resolution stated that the General Assembly "3. Affirms that the application of their sover-
eignty in order to safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and that any
disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of
Vol. 14:465
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Duties of States adopted by the General Assembly in 1972.42
A distinctive Latin American position towards the arbitration of in-
vestment disputes also seems to have emerged. The majority of the Latin
American states "remain suspicious of the arbitration process," fearing
that "arbitration is designed to evade the local laws" or that "the arbitra-
tion process may be used solely for the investor's benefits. '43 Uncertainty
with arbitral institutions, procedures, and arbitrators reinforces this sus-
picion and has impeded the growth of arbitration among the Latin Amer-
ican states.4 4 Many of them "simply do not believe that their interests
will be safeguarded by the internationally recognized institutional arbi-
tration centers.' 4 Thus, the Latin American states refused to sign the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States. As of January 1, 1981, only five Latin
American countries (Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador and Mexico) have
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Only six countries (Chile, Panama,
Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and Parguay) have ratified the 1975 Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.46 Even
Secretary of State Kissinger's effort in 1974 to overcome the impasse by
encouraging "the establishment of a working group to examine various
procedures for factfinding, conciliation, or the settlement of disputes"'
7
proved unacceptable.' s
Although there have been a few exceptions to this general nonarbi-
tration principle, such exceptions "are out of the mainstream of Latin
American practice" and "[t]here is no present likelihood, despite
each State carrying out such measures... "
42 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.31) at 52, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974). Re-
printed in 14 IML 251 (1975). This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 120-6 (including
the United States)-10. The relevant article, which was proposed by Mexico, is 2(2)(c). "To
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate
compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In
any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of
the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means."
43 McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 Ier'L LAw. 216 (1979).
44 D. Straus, So Perfect in Theory-So Neglected in Practice, (March 1978)(Paper
presented at Sixth International Arbitration Congress, Mexico City), reprinted in Mc-
Laughlin, Id. at 216-217.
45 McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 217.
4 Id. at 216.
47 Statement by H. Kissinger (released February 21, 1974), reprinted in 70 DmPr. OF
STATE BULL. 257, 260 (1974).
48 Rodgers, supra note 36, at 4.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
whatever specific nations may do in special cases, that Latin American
nations can be brought to agree upon a general investment dispute mech-
anism. In fact, the current probabilities are strongly in the opposite direc-
tion."'4 9 However, "while Latins have held fast to Calvoism in the ab-
stract, they have, in practice, begun to show some willingness to dilute
principle with a dash of self-interest in certain recent foreign investment
cases."50 The settlement of the Marcona dispute in Peru and the partial
settlement of U.S. oil company claims against Venzuela for its 1975 na-
tionalizations are instances where Peru and Venezuela as well as the
United States were "prepared to temper principle with practicality."51
In any event, the Venezuelan transfer, together with the Marcona case
and other recent experience, suggests that there may be something new
in the air in the Western Hemisphere with respect to investment dis-
putes. On both sides, there is movement away from earlier, rigid posi-
tions: in Latin America, tip-toeing away from Calvo and its strict insis-
tence that nationalization is the exclusive concern of host countries; and,
in the United States, movement away from the conviction that formal
international machinery is the only remedy and that the justice of each
final result is to be measured by rigid standards of compensation.
52
This "ideological detente" between the United States and a limited
number of Latin American states will be tested if the Carribean Based
Initiative recently announced by the Reagan administration receives Con-
gressional approval. Under this program, the United States will provide
and support economic assistance to select countries of Central America
and the Carribean. However, continued adherence to the Calvo Doctrine
by any country will likely preclude its receipt of this assistance.5 3
III. THE THIRD WORLD STATES
Although the developing states have not had the same historical ex-
perience as the Latin American states with the laws of State Responsibil-
ity, some of their scholars in the early 1960s renewed the ideological at-
tack upon these laws. Abi-Saab characterized this branch of international
law as one which "most exemplifies the cleavage between the newly inde-
pendent states and the older European ones."'" Castafieda claimed that
the developing states viewed the laws of State Responsibility as "merely
49 Id. at 5.
51 Id. at 6.
51 Id. at 10.
Il Id. at 10-11.
53 Discussions with State Department officials during a Scholar-Diplomat Seminar on
Economic and Business Affairs, Washington, D.C., (February 8-12, 1982).
"Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An
Outline, How. L.J. 95, 113 (1962).
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the legal garb that served to cloak and protect the imperialistic interests
of the international oligarchy during the nineteenth century and the first
part of the twentieth."55 These laws reflected the power of the investor
countries; and, in practice, the doctrine of State Responsibility meant in-
equality of rights."
One of the most critical attacks upon State Responsibility came from
Guha-Roy, who argued that the doctrine of State Responsibility "protects
an unjustified status quo, or, to put it more bluntly, makes itself a hand-
maid of power in the preservation of its spoils" so long as the rules favor
the rights and interests that the Western states acquired during the peri-
ods of colonial abuse.5 7 He also .called into question the universality of
these laws because they were based upon custom which was "binding only
among states where it grew up or came to be adopted."5 8 Diplomatic pro-
tection could no longer be considered a part of universal international law
because the responsibility for injury to an alien was "a responsibility not
to the home state of the injured alien but to the injured alien himself."59
Since this responsibility was based upon municipal law, the international
standard of justice used in the past to impute responsibility could not be
applied. Until the laws of State Responsibility could be revised, "the old
rules will probably have to be applied," but he suggested that they be put
in "cold storage," or invoked as little as possible. Guha-Roy hoped that
appropriate treaties and conventions could be worked out among all
states to reflect the law to control the administration of State Responsi-
bility rather than to continue with the customary rules.60
The work of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee repre-
sents one of the first attempts by the Third World states to establish a
position on the traditional laws governing State Responsibility for Inju-
ries to Aliens. The status of aliens, State Responsibility, and diplomatic
protection were proposed for the Consultative Committee's consideration
by the Japanese Government at the Committee's First Session in 1958.1
At its Third Session in 1960 the Committee postponed deliberation on
diplomatic protection and state responsibility and began their study on
the status of aliens.6 2 Since the International Law Commission had not
53 Castafleda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International
Law, 15 INT'L ORG. 38, 39 (1961).
4 Id.
57 Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal
International Law? 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863, 866 (1961).
5 Id. at 867-868.
59 Id. at 889.
41 Id. at 890.
61 ASIAN AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE CommrrrE., REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION
(1958).
42 ASIAN AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE CoMmrrFE, REPORT OF THE THIRD SESSION
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yet finalized its report on State Responsibility, the Committee believed
that its own study on these areas would be premature. 3 In 1965, at its
Seventh Session, the Committee decided further to consider diplomatic
protection in conjunction with State Responsibility at some future
session.6
4
Although the Committee's Secretariat originally advanced the mini-
mum standard of treatment in the suggested draft articles on the status
of aliens at the Third Session, it was evident that the Committee itself
rejected the minimum standard and supported the equality of treatment
between nationals and aliens. 5 The position of the Committee was that
"in the context of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of
Human Rights every State was expected to accord fair treatment to its
own nationals, which should be taken note of whilst formulating princi-
ples on the treatment of foreigners."6 6 To accord the minimum standard
of treatment to aliens "irrespective of the way a State treated its own
subjects has become out of date .... "7 According to the Committee,
foreigners should receive the same treatment as nationals because they
reside in a country for their own ends and they should be satisfied if they
receive the same treatment as the nationals of that country.6 8
Following this direction the Secretariat argued in the commentary to
the "Principles Concerning Admissions and Treatment of Aliens"
adopted at the Fourth Session, that the nature and extent of modem
state practice on an alien's essential rights was found in the Guerrero Re-
port to The Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law
in 1930. Accordingly, the maximum which a state could claim for its na-
tionals was "civil equality" with the nationals of the receiving state, un-
less other obligations were embodied in a treaty.69 The Secretariat main-
tained that the resident alien "does not derivehis essential rights directly
from international law but from the municipal law of the host State con-
cerned.... 7o
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee gave only prelimi-
nary consideration to diplomatic protection before assigning it as a future
(1960). [hereinafter cited as THIRD SESSION].
" The Committee also did not believe that these two areas were related "to the sub-
stantive rights of aliens regarding their status and treatment." Id. at 85.
ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION, 57
(1965).
61 THIRD SESSION, supra note 62, at 83-84.
86 Id.
67 Id.
" Id.
so AsIAN-ARIcAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FOURTH SESSION, 81
(1961). [hereinafter cited as FOURTH SESSION].
70 Id. at 81.
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topic for the work of the Committee. However, in a draft article prepared
by the Secretariat on the "Right of Protection by the Home State of the
Alien" for the Committee's work on the status of aliens at the Third Ses-
sion, 1 the conditions described by the Secretariat, under which diplo-
matic protection was to be exercised, did not differ appreciably from
those found in the 1961 Restatement of the American Law Institute or in
the Harvard Draft.7 2 When discussed by the Committee, it again became
evident that the Secretariat's position was not acceptable to a majority of
the states.73 Information obtained from the member governments indi-
cated that while diplomatic protection was accepted by them, it was to be
exercised "only in cases of necessity, such as denial of justice," rather
than in instances following a delay of justice.7 4 Ceylon argued that the
Calvo Doctrine could "be accepted as a principle of international law
among the Asian-African countries," but Burma and Iraq did not accept
this argument.7 5 Ceylon's position found support from Indonesia and the
United Arab Republic because both considered the Calvo Clause as being
a measure to safeguard "the newly won independence of the Asian-Afri-
can States and to avoid intervention in the affairs of these countries
7)78
At its Fourth Session, the Committee drafted several articles con-
cerned with the right of states to nationalize the property of aliens and
the extent to which compensation should be paid. Under Article II, the
alien's right to acquire and hold property was accepted "subject to the
local laws, regulations, and order and. . . to the conditions imposed for
his admission into the State .... ,7 Under Article 12, if nationalization
of property occurred, compensation was to be "in accordance with local
law, regulations and orders."7 8 Japan appeared to be the only state to
question this standard of compensation, arguing that "just compensation"
should be paid instead. 9 The Secretariat's commentary noted that "the
realities of the Modem World would make it impossible in many cases to
71 THmD SESSION, supra note 62, at 130.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §202
(1965). See also, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, Article 24 (1961).
73 THIRD SESSION, supra note 62.
7" Id. at 140.
71 Id. at 143.
71 Id. It was also evident from the responses of the member governments that there was
varied interpretation of state responsibility arising from acts and omissions, including ultra
vires acts, of officials and political subdivisions, and with respect to the due diligence rule
regarding the acts of private individuals. Id. at 141-142.
7 Article 11 of the Committee's final report on "Principles Concerning Admission and
Treatment of Aliens." FOURTH SESSION, supra note 64, at 49.
78 Article 12, Id.
79 FOURTH SESSION, supra note 64, at 131.
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adhere to the principle of full compensation. The principle of just com-
pensation has to give way to considerations of the debtor's political and
economic instability or its capacity to pay."'80 Moreover, the industrially
advanced nations had begun to appreciate these political and economic
conditions by their acceptance of the en bloc method of settlement where
compensation was likely to be less than the full market value., l
The early deliberations of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Com-
mittee reveal the influence of the Latin American position among the
member states of the Committee. The merging of interests of both the
Latin American and Asian-African states would become more pronounced
a decade later in other international forums and in the redirection of the
International Law Commission's work on State Responsibility. 2 Opposi-
tion to the codification of the laws of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens by the small and developing states was one of the principal factors
leading to the failure of the previous effort to codify this branch of inter-
national law at The Hague Conference in 1930.
Guha-Roy's suggestion to put the rules of State Responsibility in
"cold storage" seems to be gaining acceptance. The developed states ap-
pear increasingly reluctant to grant diplomatic protection to their citizens
for non-economic injuries in foreign countries. The United States appar-
ently rejects requests for diplomatic protection on a routine basis, primar-
ly on grounds that this is insufficient evidence to substantiate the alleged
non-economic injury. Such requests may be raised to the level of inter-
governmental inquiry, but no American citizen within recent memory has
been granted diplomatic protection on the basis of a non-economic in-
80 Id.
a' Id. at 141-142.
82 The Responsibility of States has been a topic for codification by the International
Law Commission since its first session in 1949. When, in 1953, the Cuban delegation intro-
duced a draft resolution requesting the International Law Commission to undertake codifi-
cation of the principles of international law governing State Responsibility, F.V. Garcia-
Amador, the Cuban representative in the Sixth Committee and later to become the first
Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility in the International Law Commission, argued
that it "was undeniable that the question of State Responsibility was at present ripe for
codification." 8 U.N. GAOR Sixth Committee (393d Mtg.) at 161. The frequent criticism in
the International Law Commission and in the Sixth Committee of Garcia-Amador's six re-
ports, including the failure of the Commission to give the topic much attention before his
term of the Commission expired in 1961, led the Commission, in 1962, to give greater prior-
ity to the topic by appointing a subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Roberto Ago of
Italy. The work of the subcommittee was to be "devoted primarily to the general aspects of
State Responsibility." (See Ago's first report, A/CN. 4/152, YEARBOOK OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW COMMISSIONS, VOL. II, at 227-259 (1963). In contrast to "State re-
sponsibility stricto sensu that characterized the work of Garcia-Amador, the work of Ago is
viewed as "state responsibility lato sensu." For a discussion and comparison of state respon-
sibility stricto sensu and lato sensu relative to expropriation, see: Goldie, State Responsi-
bility and the Expropriation of Property, 12 INT'L L. 63-82 (1978).
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jury. 3 Thus, without much notice, the international standard is giving
way to the national standard of treatment.
The priority given by the Third World states to economic develop-
ment has also significantly affected the current applicability of the Laws
of State Responsibility to investment disputes. The validity of the old
international economic order, under which this branch of international
law developed, was first shattered by the Bolshevik Revolution and by
the nationalization of agrarian lands under the 1917 Mexican Constitu-
tion.84 Third World states now assume that their governments will play a
major role in the economic development of their countries. Many of them,
for political rather than economic reasons, consider the rejection of the
Western capitalist model as a prerequisite for this role. Unwilling to be
bound by the minimum standard, the Third World states claim as an
attribute of their sovereignty, the right to settle investment disputes by
their domestic tribunals and under their laws. The Calvo Doctrine has
been endorsed by the Third World as an ideological and legal underpin-
ning for this right.8 5
The developed states, although still insisting upon many traditional
norms, have established a number of bilateral and multilateral mecha-
nisms under which investment protection and the settlement of invest-
ment disputes can be promoted without resort to diplomatic protection
and international claims. The need for diplomatic protection has not been
eliminated, however. Considering the Latin American and Third World
attack on diplomatic protection, Lillich argues that "the modern doctrine
of diplomatic protection of nationals abroad warrants the continued vig-
orous support of all englightened internationalists."8' The new mecha-
nisms have neither resolved the differences over issues such as compensa-
tion and the applicable law nor reduced the intensity of the ideological
debate, but they have provided means by which the developed and devel-
oping states can accomodate their more immediate and conflicting eco-
nomic interests.
In the final analysis, the willingness of the Third World states to ac-
cept these mechanisms is still a reflection of their inherent economic and
political weakness and their dependency upon development assistance
from the capital exporting states. As this assistance becomes more limited
in relation to need, or is increasingly allocated to the developing states
according to specific political objectives, Third World acceptance of the
83 See supra note 57.
84 Eze, Legal Structures for the Resolution of International Problems in the Domain
of Private Foreign Investments: A Third World Perspective Now and in the Future, 9 GA.
J. INT'L AND Comp. L. 541 (1979).
88 See generally supra note 20 et seq. and accompanying text.
s Lillich, supra note 38, at 364-365.
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bilateral and multilateral schemes may become more pronounced. How-
ever, "the resolution of international problems is not a purely mechanical
affair. ' 87 The structure of these mechanisms, as well as their law, is "de-
termined by the control of economic and political power."8 8 So long as a
basic inequality exists between the developed and underdeveloped states,
"the struggle to alter or maintain the rules of the game will persist."8 9
The willingness of the developed states to support mechanisms to
prevent or resolve investment disputes between their nationals and Third
World governments has been encouraged by many factors. The developed
states recognize the ideological risks they face from any dogmatic adher-
ence to the status quo. Political considerations, including the perception
of future economic benefits, may also require a normalization of relations
with a Third World government despite that government's previous ex-
propriation of alien property. Lump-sum settlements are frequently the
result. Additionally, the political influence of a developed state accompa-
nies, in varying degrees, its foreign private investment. Economically,
some investments are encouraged because of their domestic economic
benefits. Foreign investment in raw materials and energy not only en-
hances secured access to these resources but has strategic implications as
well. Specifically, the United States investment guarantee program, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), is seen as reducing do-
mestic political pressure for some responsive action against a foreign gov-
ernment if that government has expropriated American business.90 Be-
sides potential deterrence of expropriation, OPIC also enables the
American government to influence multinational corporations in an in-
vestment dispute, including the reduction of inflated book values of lost
assets and the requirement that the insured corporation, as a precondi-
tion for payment under OPIC, must attempt good faith negotiations.9'
Without this leverage, investment disputes could remain unsettled "with
potentially harmful results for U.S. foreign policy." 9
IV. INVESTMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS
In the attempt to encourage private investment in the Third World,
the developed states have established a range of investment incentives for
their nationals including investment guarantee programs. These programs
WEze, supra note 84, at 537.
" Id.
89 Id. at 546.
90 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORA-
TION: A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS, prepared by the Library of Congress for the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 97 (1973).
91 Id. at 98.
92 Id.
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provide insurance to cover political and non-commercial risks such as ex-
propriation, inconvertibility, revolution, insurrection, and war. A few
states (Japan and Switzerland) provide some protection even for commer-
cial risks. 3 Under recent legislation, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation can now offer insurance coverage for civil strife resulting
from civil disturbances or acts of terrorism.9'
Eighteen countries, including the United States, offer some form of
insurance for private direct foreign investment. 5 The primary goal of
nine of these programs (Australia, Austria, West Germany, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) is host country development."6 Programs in seven coun-
tries (Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Japan, and Korea) seek in-
creased foreign exports, financial returns, and access to raw materials.9 7
The programs also differ in terms of country coverage. Five programs
(West Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) provide
insurance only in non-Eastern bloc developing states.9 8 Four programs
(Switzerland, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States) include
one or more Eastern bloc countries among the developing countries cov-
ered by the investment guarantees." Nine programs (Australia, Austria,
Canada, France, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain) cover in-
vestments in all countries. OPIC is unique among the programs in that
priorities are established among the developing states."' In 1978, Con-
gress revised OPIC's insurance authorization by requiring OPIC to give
preference to projects in the poorer developing countries (per capita in-
come under $520 in 1975 dollars) and restricted activities to special
projects, primarily mineral and energy, in countries where per capita in-
come was over $1,000.111 In 1981, these limits were raised to $680 and
$2,950 in 1979 dollars.10 2
Although current evaluative data is lacking, OPIC is by far the larg-
93 Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2nd Session, 224 (1980). [Hereinafter cited as Overseas
Private Investment Corporation].
94 Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
65, 95 Stat. 1021, 1022 (1981). For a discussion of State Responsibility on terrorism in gen-
eral, see Lillich and Paxman, State Responsibility For Injuries Occasioned by Terrorist
Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217-313 (1977). [Hereinafter Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration Act].
95 Overseas Private Investment Corporation Senate Hearings, supra note 93, at 224.
" Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
211 Id.
102 Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act, supra note 94, at 1021.
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est of the existing programs. For example, as of the end of 1974, Japan's
insurance coverage amounted to 36 percent of the almost three billion
dollar coverage provided by OPIC.' 0 3 The West Germany program, the
third largest, provided only 14 percent of the total American coverage.?
4
All other programs at that time provided only 1 percent or less of
OPIC's total dollar coverage.105
The geographical distribution of the investment coverage also varies
and tends to follow trade patterns. Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry provides 58 percent of its coverage to Asia and 26
percent to Latin America. West Germany's Treuarbeit provides 35 per-
cent of its investment coverage to Africa, 26 percent to Latin America,
and 15 percent to Asia. OPIC's recent coverage of investment projects
has the following geographical distrubution: Latin America (40 percent),
Asia (35 percent), Middle East (12.8 percent), and Europe (0.7
percent).'08
Unfortunately, data which would indicate the total amount of private
direct investment to the developing states covered by investment guaran-
tee programs is unavailable, although various estimates have been made
for OPIC's coverage of U.S. private direct investment. Franklin and West
cite a 1977 market study of American businesses having overseas invest-
ment potential. The study indicated that OPIC is likely to insure be-
tween 35 percent and 50 percent of the LDC investment projects by these
companies.' °0 In terms of the total dollar amount of investment covered,
they cite another study that indicates that this may vary from 17 to 94
percent in any one year. 08 Between fiscal years 1974-1980, OPIC pro-
vided insurance for investments in 60 developing countries covering
projects totaling some $6.8 billion. 0 9 Other data indicates that at the end
of 1979, total United States direct investment in the LDC's amounted to
$48 billion, or about 25 percent of total U.S. private foreign investment." 0
Unlike most other investment guarantee programs, OPIC requires a
bilateral agreement between the host government and the United States
as a pre-condition for OPIC insurance guarantees to U.S. private inves-
tors."' These agreements set forth the procedural understandings be-
,03 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, supra note 67, at 176.
104 Id.
105 Id.
100 State Department data provided to the author (February 12, 1982).
107 Franklin and West, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments
Act of 1978: A Reaffirmation of the Development Role of Investment Insurance, 14 TEx.
INT'L L. J. 15-16 (1979).
100 Id.
,09 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, supra note 93, at 70.
110 U.S. Prosperity and The Developing countries, GIST (June, 1981).
" DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAw, 702 (1977).
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tween the two governments regarding OPIC operations, including the
host government's approval of all investment projects to be insured. Ad-
ditionally, and in contrast to other investment guarantee programs, the
host government recognizes the subrogation of the United States Govern-
ment if OPIC makes a claim under the agreement.112 (Apparently, the
United States has not yet assumed subrogation in any claim). The agree-
ments also establish inter-governmental mechanisms for the resolution of
disputes, i.e., inter-governmental negotiations followed by arbitration
rather than the exhaustion of local remedies.113 Under a model agree-
ment, a dispute, if not resolved within three months, win be submitted at
the initiative of either government to an arbitral tribunal.1 4 Either party
may also submit "the question of whether such dispute presents a ques-
tion of public international law" and the tribunal, in making a final and
binding decision, "shall base its decision on the applicable principles and
rules of public international law."1 1 5
OPIC's record of claims settlement is indicative of its success. Since
its establishment in 1969, and including claims submitted under earlier
programs administered by the Department of State's Agency for Interna-
tional Development formed in 1961, OPIC had settled 119 insurance
claims, by the end of February 1981.118 Of these claims, 74 were for incon-
vertibility, 32 for expropriation, and 13 for war, revolution, or insurrec-
tion.117 Moreover, according to recent testimony in Congressional hear-
ings, "there have been no repudiations or defaults on any OPIC-
guarantee host government obligations, although certain obligations were
rescheduled as part of Chile's general external debt rescheduling."11 8
These figures compare with the 136 old and new disputes involving U.S.
private direct foreign investment in existence between March 1, 1977, and
February 29, 1980, of which only 19 had been settled during that two year
period.11  Most of the claims (approximately 82 percent) were for disputes
involving nationalization or expropriation.
20
Since the 1960s various efforts have been made to structure a multi-
112 Id. at 698.
11s DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW, supra note 115, at 700.
114 Id.
115 Id.
n6 Extension and Revision of Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Hearings on
H.R. 3136 Before House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st Sess., 84 (1981).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 85.
1,, BuREAu Op INTLLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. STATE DEPT., DISPUTES INVOLVING U.S.
PRIVATE DIECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (March 1, 1977-February 29, 1980), 4 (1980).
(Unclassified).
120 Id.
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lateral approach to investment guarantees."2" These efforts resulted from
the limitations of national programs such as regulations restricting cover-
age. In extremely large and relatively high risk projects such as minerals
and energy, there may be insufficient coverage. Moreover, some govern-
ments from the developed states believe that a coordination of their ef-
forts would enable the capital exporting states to discourage LDC actions
against the investors of any one country.'22 These efforts have not been
successful to date.1
23
The potential of investment guarantee programs, national and mul-
tinational, is evident. If OPIC can serve as the model, then the need to
resort to diplomatic protection, and its requirement that the foreign in-
vestor exhaust all local remedies, can be avoided. OPIC itself is not with-
out its critics, however. A considerable number of uncertainties and weak-
nesses in the OPIC contracts1" have been noted and doubts exist about
their significance in reducing political risk.125 In general, the lack of cov-
erage provided by the programs makes it clear that foreign investors
should look elsewhere for additional means for protecting investments.
V. THE ARBITRATION OF INVESTMENT DisPuTEs
The resolution of international disputes through arbitration has a
long history, but only in the last few decades has arbitration become a
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes between private for-
"' The following discussion on efforts to establish multilateral investment insurance
guarantee programs is based upon the author's discussion with State Department Officials,
supra note 53. See also G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 170-181 (1969).
122 Id.
"2 Between 1962-1973, the World Bank held frequent discussions on the International
Investment Insurance Agency (IIIA). Draft articles have been prepared at various times, but
agreement was never reached because of the inability of the member governments to resolve
a number of issues including: the IIIA's linkage to the World Bank; the allocation of voting
rights between the capital-exporting and importing countries; the extent of financial partici-
pation; the subrogation rights for the hIA; the arbitration requirements and procedures,
and the relationship of the HA to the national investment guarantee programs.
Other programs have been suggested as well. In 1976, Secretary of State Kissenger pro-
posed to UNCTAD an International Resource Bank (IRB), and the Berne Union considered
an International Investment Reinsurance Association (IIRA). An Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank Gaurantee Fund for Minerals and Energy Development was discussed in the late
1970's. During 1981, OPEC considered an investment guarantee system to cover some form
of political risk so as to encourage OPEC investment in the LDCs. Early in 1982, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank sponsored discussions with the international
banking community on their participation in a possible guarantee scheme. Further indica-
tions are that the Reagan Administration will renew previous U.S. efforts to gain support for
establishing the IIIA.
2, Koven, Expropriation and the 'Jurisprudence' of OPIC, 22 HARv. INV'L L. J.
M2 Heller, Political Risk Insurance, 12 J. INT'L L. AND ECON. 231 (1978).
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eign investors and host governments. Prior to the World Bank Conven-
tion on the Settlement of International Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, which entered into force in 1966,
private investors lacked jurisdictional capacity in international law. In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, local law governed the foreign
investment. If a dispute arose, the foreign investor could appeal, after
the exhaustion of local remedies, to his government for diplomatic protec-
tion in hope that the government would accept the claim for esprousal
before an international tribunal. Thus, the Convention represented a sig-
nificant breakthrough since previous international efforts to give the for-
eign investor a status under international law had failed.126
The Convention allows for binding arbitration and the enforcement
of arbitral awards.12 7 It also contains certain features which are attractive
to private investors and host governments alike.1 28 The Convention "af-
fords private persons the only institutionalized international forum for
litigating with states, and its jurisdictional requirements concerning na-
tionality are less restrictive than those of the nationality of claims
rules."12 9 Having signed an agreement for arbitration, it is difficult for
either party to avoid arbitration proceedings by refusing to participate in
either the formation of the panels or in the proceedings. 30 Since awards
are also to be considered binding by all contracting parties, the signato-
ries are expected to enforce awards within their own territories. 3 1 On the
other hand, the government of the investor is precluded from granting
diplomatic protection to its national or bringing an international claim
until the other contracting party has failed, to abide by the arbitral
award.1 32 In the arbitration process, the applicable law is that of the host
state unless mutual agreement determines otherwise. 133 The host state
may also require the exhaustion of local remedies before beginning any
arbitration proceedings.1 3 4 Arbitration, as well as conciliation, is adminis-
tered by the Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.3 '
Consistent with its consensual character, the Convention does not de-
fine "investment," as does OPIC, but leaves it to the discretion of the
126 Sutherland, The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, 28 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 367, 370 (1979).
'17 See generally, Amerasinghe, The International Centre of Investment Disputes and
Development through the Multinational Corporation, VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 793.
128 Id.
121 Id. at 802.
10 Sutherland, supra note 127, at 392-393.
131 Id. at 396.
132 Id. at 397.
133 Id. at 392.
204 Id. at 373.
231 Id. at 378.
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parties since the consent of both parties is required before a dispute can
be submitted to the Centre.13 6 As noted, the Convention allows the par-
ties to select the "rules of Law" to be applied, and, if they fail to agree,
Article 42(1) states that the law shall be "the law of the contracting State
to the dispute and such rules of international law as may be applica-
ble. 1 3 7 This allows the parties to adopt among themselves, prior to the
application of Article 42(1), one of a wide range of choice-of-law provi-
sions which have been developed by the Centre, including ex aequo et
bono for either a certain portion of the agreement or the dispute in its
entirety.238 Overall, the advantages to the host state make the Conven-
tion "particularly appealing to developing countries." '
As of January 1, 1981, the Convention has been ratified by 66 states.
However, the Latin American states voted en bloc against the original
decision by the World Bank to develop the Convention and have not
signed the Convention since it was open for signature.1 40 Although the
settlement of disputes under the Convention has been slight, the lack of
cases according to OECD "need cause no surprise and is not considered
by the Centre as an indication that the Convention is not serving a useful
purpose.' 4 1 The inclusion of effective arbitration claims in agreements
"may result in an actual reduction in the number of disputes.' 142
The World Bank Convention, while receiving the greatest attention,
is only one of a number of commercial arbitral systems that are presently
in existence.'43 These include: the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce (1975), the Commercial Arbi-
tration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (1977), the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration. Rules
(1976), the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce, (1976), the European Convention on International Com-
mercial Arbitration (1961), and the rules of arbitration established for the
Eastern bloc countries under the Moscow Convention on the Settlement
by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes resulting from Economic and Scien-
116 Id. at 386.
237 Id. at 392.
138 Id. at 393.
,39 McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 223.
140 See Abbott, Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quan-
dry of Non-Ratification, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 131 (1976). As of 1 January 1981, the Conven-
tion has been ratified by 66 states.
141 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES, 107 (1975). See also Sutherland, supra note 127, at 399-400.
142 Id.
143 See Domke, Dispute Settlement by Multinational Companies, 10 J. INT'L L. &
ECON., 291-295 (1975); Holtzman, Arbitration: An Indispensable Aid to Multinational
Companies, Id. at 337-345; McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 211-232.
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tific Cooperation (1972). Optional rules have also been developed by the
United Nations Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia, and the Far
East and by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
The existence of the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (1975) provides for the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral agreements and awards, and represents a movement to-
ward arbitration among the Latin American states.1 44 The Convention
also provides that, absent mutual agreement upon applicable rules of pro-
cedure, the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbi-
tration Commission shall govern the arbitration.1 45 Although five Latin
American states have become parties to the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, only eight
Latin American states are presently parties to the Inter-American
Convention.1 4
6
The extent to which arbitration will find a willing response from the
Third World is still in doubt. More evidence that arbitration is being
used by foreign investors and Third World governments is required.
Many of these states may still view arbitration as involving "mechanisms
which primarily serve the interests of Western entities.' 47 Unless the de-
veloping states "are reasonably persuaded that arbitration will fairly pro-
tect their interests, its potential will remain unrealized .... ,1"4 A possi-
ble move toward realization of this potential would be the regionalization
of the arbitration centers along with "full-scale attempts to create a genu-
ine partnership between the national judiciary and the arbitration cen-
ters. ' 14 9 While the World Bank Convention has been seen as a break-
through, the Convention has not really provided "a means around the
impasse" over the applicability of international law to private foreign in-
vestments.'5 0 "What the Convention did do was to codify the status quo
with all of its unresolved issues."'' 5'
VI. OTHER MEANS TO REDUCE INVESTMENT RISK
Besides investment guarantee programs and the arbitration of invest-
M" Leich, The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
75 Am. J. INT'L L.
14 Id. at 983.
146 Id. at 982-83.
147 McLaughlin, supra note 47, at 231.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 232.
,11 Eze, supra note 84, at 231. For a review of some recent arbitral decisions, see von
Mehren and Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and Foreign National
Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476-552 (1981) and Belaume,
State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 784-819 (1981).
151 Id.
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ment disputes, a foreign investor has other means available to reduce in-
vestment risks. In some instances, private investors may rely upon the
traditional bilateral commercial treaty between their state and another.
As have other developed states, the United States has concluded Friend-
ship, Commercial and Navigation (FCN) treaties with numerous coun-
tries. Such treaties indicate the receptiveness of a state toward American
investment and require national or most-favored-nation treatment to
American investment. The latter provisions are designed to prevent dis-
cretionary and discriminatory action against American investment. The
treaties may recognize the right of the state to expropriate American in-
vestment for "public purposes" and may establish the standard of com-
pensation to be paid the investor following expropriation. Unfortunately,
these treaties do not precisely define legal obligations or cover all issues
which may be of concern to a foreign investor, for example, taxation,152
and may be terminated on notice. Moreover, the number of FCN treaties
with the developing states in Africa, Asia, and Latin American states is
less than desirable. 15
An American investor may also be able to obtain insurance coverage
through other guarantee programs provided by the U.S. government.15'
Frequently, the countries with which the United States has concluded
FCN treaties are also the countries with which the U.S. has established
such programs under the Mutual Security Act of 1954.155 The protection
offered (inconvertibility, expropriation, and war damage) requires that
the investment be acceptable to both states. 56 The United States also
provides, as do most major trading states, commercial and political risk
1 A. Fatouros, LEGAL SECURITY FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, reprinted in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 707 (Freidman & Pugh eds. 1959). Fatouros and Snyder,
Protection of Foreign Investment: Examination and Appraisal, 10 IN'L & CoMP. L. Q. 469-
494 (1961), provides a perspective on the protection of foreign investment as it was available
over two decades ago.
Ids W. FRIEDMANN, 0. Lissrrzm, AND R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 857 (1969); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, AND H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 783-789 (1980). Bilateral agreements to allow for the operation of the OPIC
program are more numerous, although the investments must be approved by the host gov-
ernment and only new investments are covered. Lom6 11, concluded in 1980 between the
European Community and 58 African, Caribbean, and Pacific states provides for the most-
favored-nation clause, "which in effect means that the protection of large portions of foreign
investment in these areas comes fairly close to the Hull ['prompt, adequate and effective
compensation'] standard." Dolzer notes further that "the highest total number of invest-
ment treaties so far has been concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany." Dolzer, New
Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 565 (1981).
14 See Editorial Board, Foreign Seizure of Investment: Remedies and Protection, 12
STANFORD LAW R. 625 (1960).
185 Mutual Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. 1933, repealed Pub. L. No. 87-195, pt. I, §
642(a)(2), 75 Stat. 460 (1961).
388 See note 155, supra.
Vol. 14:465
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
coverage through the Export-Import Bank for export credit and financial
transactions. 157 Additionally, limited insurance protection from private
carriers is available.
158
Protection may also be offered by the host state. Governmental pol-
icy statements to encourage foreign investment, while not legally binding
upon the government, can set out the intentions of the government to-
ward foreign investment. These intentions, if incorporated into legislation
or investment contracts, are of greater value to the investor than a policy
statement. 159 Although investment code intentions need to be incorpo-
rated into a contract, "there is no investment code in any of the develop-
ing countries which provide a remedy where the government responsible
for creating the statute fails to live up to its provisions."'' 6 Even if statu-
tory remedy is provided, problems such as action against the state being
limited by sovereign immunity, access to courts being restricted, or the
statute being repealed can occur.' 6 ' Constitutional provisions, containing
property protection clauses and the international law standard, may pro-
vide considerably more protection than investment codes, but constitu-
tional provisions are not a contract, and revisions may occur at any
time. 162
Without coverage under an investment guarantee program and be-
cause of limited assurance of protection under statutory or constitutional
provisions, protection for foreign investment becomes essentially a con-
tractual arrangement. The "four crucial issues" that should be resolved
by the contract are-(1) the law applicable to the contract, for which Ar-
ticle 42 of the World Bank Convention may provide guidance; (2) the
sanctions which are to occur upon the breach of the contract; (3) detailed
provisions for the effect of changing circumstances; and (4) the careful
specification of the rights and obligations of the parties under the con-
tract.6 3 A clause regulating the conditions under which expropriation
may occur, if it is possible to agree on such a formulation, is a further
condition that should be specified in an investment contract to ensure
that "creeping nationalization" is covered.' With longterm extractive
investments "the investor should attempt to obtain host state agreement
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies to the concessional
,57 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 153, at 868-870; L. HENKEN, supra note 153, at 787.
158 Koven, supra note 125, at 269.
159 E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES, 55 (1965).
110 Id. at 61.
,' Id. at 61-62.
162 Id. at 58-61.
10' Ryan, Investment Contracts and the Developing Countries, AUSTRALIAN Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 1970/1973, at 94 (1975).
I" Id. at 101-102.
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agreement."' 5
Investors themselves may be able to reduce investment risks, particu-
larly expropriation, through a joint venture with the host government."6 '
Manufacturing industries are less likely to be nationalized than extractive
or service industries, especially if components for the industry must be
imported from abroad.1 7 A foreign investor can lessen exposure to na-
tionalization by moving away from direct investments to management-
service contracts."6 " Indirect investments, through patent, trademark, or
know-how licensing, are also possible but may pose somewhat greater
risks. '6 In the later instance, the investor can undertake long and multi-
ple litigation to prevent marketing elsewhere of the goods.' Joint-ven-
ture projects, especially in minerals involving companies from several
countries, as well as an inter-governmental lending agency, may provide
"a large measure of invulnerability against nationalization."1 7'
Under some circumstances, a foreign investor's last resort may lie in
the request for diplomatic protection. 7 2 For the American investor, a few
additional options remain. If the political pressure is sufficient, the Amer-
ican President may apply the Hickenlooper and Gonzales amendments as
political and economic threats against the offending state so as to per-
suade settlement.17 3 However, the effectiveness of such action by the
United States is very much in doubt and the amendments have been ap-
plied rarely. If all else fails, the American investor can avail himself of
federal tax benefits by deducting the loss.7 4
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When Friedmann, in 1963, spoke of the "promising beginnings" tak-
ing place in detaching the debate over the proper legal treatment of for-
eign investment "from the sterility that has characterized it for a good
many years,'' 7 5 he called attention to the 1962 UN Resolution on the
165 Pedersen, Expropriation in International Law-Strategies of Avoidance and Re-
dress, 10 TOLEDO LAW R. 122 (1978). For a discussion of recent mineral agreements with
developing countries, see Smith and Wells, Jr., Mineral Agreements in Developing Coun-
tries: Structure and Substance, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 560-590.
16 Id. at 118.
167 Id. at 120.
166 Id. at 121.
169 Id.
170 Id.
7 Rood, Compensation for Takeovers in Africa, 11 J. INT'L L. AND ECON. 535 (1977).
172 See Adede, A Survey of Treaty Provisions on the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Rem-
edies, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 17 (1977).
171 Pedersen, supra note 166, at 109.
174 Id. at 111.
171 Friedmann, supra note 4, at 127.
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Permanent Control [sic] over Natural Resources, the 1962 OECD Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, and the 1963 Report
by the Committee on International Trade and Investment of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. As he saw it, the importance of the UN Resolution
was in the principles it endorsed, that is, "good faith" observance of for-
eign investment agreements, and following nationalization, expropriation,
or requisitioning on grounds of public purpose, "appropriate compensa-
tion, in accordance with the rules in force in the state... and in accor-
dance with international law. ' 176 The importance of the OECD Draft
Convention was that it expressed "the reasoned consensus of the Western
Nations" for "just compensation," a standard which mediated "between
uncompensated taking-or compensation only for the depreciated value
of installations-on the one side, and for damages as measured by munic-
ipal contract or tort standards on the other side .... 1"1 The importance
of the A.B.A. Report lay in "its recognition that there is an ideological
and social conflict, that the aspirations of the developing nations,
decolonized or otherwise, are not simply to be dismissed as the aberra-
tions of lawless brigands, but express a genuine conflict of interests and
approaches, a new phase in the evolution of international law, a challenge
that demands a response. M 78
The "promising beginnings" cited by Friedmann for the necessary le-
gal protection of private direct investment did not materialize. As we
have seen, the 1962 UN Resolution was followed by succeeding resolu-
tions which, ideologically at least, moved further to the Third World posi-
tion. 17 The OECD Draft Resolution, later adopted with minor revisions
in 1967, has not found support among the developing states. Although no
longer seen as "lawless brigands," the developing states would argue that
their aspirations are still being dismissed.
The principle issues which divided the developed and the developing
states at the time Friedmann wrote are present today and still debated
with an ideological intensity no less than before. The Third World states,
because they control the forum, will persist in their quest for the New
International Economic Order; the developed states, forced now to vote
against or abstain in the forums, will maintain their own ideological insis-
tence upon the traditional norms and will control the purse strings of
developmental assistance. Ideologically, there is an impasse, but as always
is the case, with a tilt in favor of the political and economic power of the
developed states.
Nevertheless, an accommodation is taking place, but the accommoda-
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 127-128.
'79 See notes 37-42 supra.
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tion is based largely upon the continuing and increasing power disparities
of the developed and developing states. The developed states, through
their investment guarantee programs, have provided a mechanism for
protection which the Third World states can accept or reject. That most
of them have accepted the operation of these programs within their coun-
tries is significant. The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States repre-
sents a further attempt to find accommodation on a process and not
necessarily upon the legal norms to be applied. The development of mul-
tilateral investment insurance programs and the greater use of arbitration
will be required before private foreign investors may ignore carefully
drawn investment contracts. Until then, diplomatic protection and inter-
national claims, while dispensed with under insurance programs like
OPIC and in the World Bank Convention, will also continue to serve as a
traditional means for protecting private direct foreign investment. The
ideological impasse will remain for the near future, but the accommoda-
tion that does exist appears to be a promising beginning.
